














Credibility  assessment  has  always  been  a  major  issue  in  refugee  determinations  and  its 
importance increases in the context of widespread introduction of ‘fast-track’ processes and the 
manifest trans-national trend to truncate (or indeed remove) avenues for review. This article 
explores the practice of credibility assessment in lower level tribunals using a case study of over 
1000 particular social group ground (PSG) decisions made on the basis of sexual orientation 
over the past 15 years. Credibility played an increasingly major role in claim refusals, and 
negative credibility assessments were not always based on well-reasoned or defensible grounds. 
The article uses this specific case study in order to ground recommendations for structural and 
institutional change aimed at improving the credibility assessment process in refugee 





[W]e should neither run  away  from credibility issues, nor pretend to be capable of knowing more than  we 
can. We are all familiar with the barriers standing  between us and “what  really happened”. We were not 
there. The  only witness  is  usually  the claimant  with  whatever  fragments  of her  life  she  puts  before us. 
Country documentation and assorted governmental and human rights reports that we receive usually paint a 
canvas with broad, crude brush strokes. They rarely provide the kind of detailed information that would be 





Refugee determinations involve the most intensely narrative mode of legal adjudication. The 
hearing depends largely – sometimes entirely – on the story of the applicant; this story is told in 
writing, orally re-told in full or in part, questioned, believed or disbelieved to varying degrees, and 
finally weighed against an assessment of future risk based on available documentary sources of 
information about the sending country to determine if the applicant faces a well founded fear of 
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happened to you? It is also a wide, speculative, political decision: is this government an on-going 
danger to (some of) its citizens? 
 
 
Credibility assessment has always been a major issue in refugee determinations2  and its 
importance increases in the context of widespread introduction of ‘fast-track’ processes3 and the 
manifest trans-national trend to truncate (or indeed remove) avenues for review.4  As refugee 
determinations become less reviewable, it is increasingly important to get them right the first 
time. Even within remaining avenues of review the ability to disturb findings on credibility is 
slight in many countries.5 Thus a general mission to improve first instance decision making must 
focus even more closely upon credibility aspects of decisions as they are the least reviewable. 
 
This article explores credibility assessment in lower level tribunals using a case study of particular 
social group ground (PSG) decisions made on the basis of sexual orientation. The research 
examined over 1000 publicly available6 refugee decisions made on the basis of sexual orientation 




2   
See  eg  Deborah  Anker,  ‘Determining  Asylum  Claims  in  the  United  States:  A  Case  Study  on  the 
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment’ (1992) 19 Review of Law and 
Social Change 433; Macklin 1998, ibid; Cécile Rousseau, François Crépeau, Patricia Foxen and France Houle, 
‘The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-Making Process of 
the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board’ (2002) 15 Journal of Refugee Studies 43; Susan Kneebone, ‘The 
Refugee Review Tribunal and the Assessment of Credibility: an Inquisitorial Role?’ (1998) 5 Australian Journal 
of Administrative Law 78; Michael Kagan, ‘Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility 
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination’ (2003) 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 367. 
 
3 
See eg Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed) (2007) at 222, 392, 
400 and 541 on acceleration procedures; see also Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Stereotyping and Acceleration – Gender, 
Procedural Acceleration and Marginalised Judicial Review in the Dutch Asylum System’ in Gregor Noll (ed), 
Proof,  Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures (2005) at 89, noting that 50 per cent of 
asylum applications in the Netherlands are processed in 48 working hours. 
 
4 
See Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, ibid. 
 
5  
See eg Guy Coffey, ‘The Credibility of Credibility Evidence at the Refugee Review Tribunal’ (2003) 15 
International  Journal  of Refugee  Law 377 at 400-411 regarding Australia. On the United States see Kristin 
Hoffman, ‘The Real ID Act: Challenging Reliability in Asylum Law’ (2006) 27 Immigration and Nationality 
Law Review 669. 
 
6   
Australian cases  were  all  obtained from the  Austlii case  database (www.austlii.edu.au). UK  cases  were 
obtained  from  the  Electronic  Immigration  Network  case  database  (www.ein.org.uk),  the  Asylum  and 
Immigration Tribunal website (www.ait.gov.uk) and LEXIS. Canadian cases were obtained from the QuickLaw, 
Canlii (www.canlii.org) and LEXIS databases. New Zealand cases were obtained from the Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority website (www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz). 
 
7  
There was a total of 528 Australian decisions, made up of 369 decisions from the Refugee Review Tribunal 
(RRT) and 159 judicial review decisions from Federal Magistrates Court, Federal Court and Full Federal Court 
of Australia, and High Court of Australia. 
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from 1994 to 2007 inclusive.11 In addition to their similar common law and human rights 
traditions, all of these countries utilise informal inquisitorial tribunal decision-making bodies at 
an early level in the refugee determination process.12 A benefit of drawing upon a subset of cases 
as part of a broader inquiry into credibility determination is that it can provide a ‘complete’ set of 
cases  on  a  particular  issue  to  offer  both  comparative  perspectives  and  information  on 





There were 116 UK decisions made up of 70 tribunal decisions and 46 judicial review decisions from the 
Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal. 
 
9  
There were 396 decisions, comprising 274 tribunal decisions and 122 judicial review cases drawn from the 
Federal Court of Canada and Federal Court of Appeal. 
 
10 




The US was excluded from the study due to the unavailability of lower level determinations. 1994 was chosen 
as the starting point for data collection as this was when sexual orientation was regarded as a settled basis for 
particular social group (PSG) claims in a number of major refugee receiving nations. See eg in Canada: Re R 
(UW) [1991] CRDD No 501 (7 October 1991); Ward v Attorney-General (Canada) [1993] 2 SCR 689; in the 
US: Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,  20 I&N Dec 819 (BIA 1990); in Australia: N93/00593 [1994] RRTA 108 (25 
January 1994); Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and  Ethnic Affairs  (1997) 190 CLR 225; in New 
Zealand: Re GJ Refugee Appeal No 1312/93 (30 August 1995). Note that sexual orientation as the basis of a 
PSG remained contested in the UK until later that decade: Vraciu v Secretary of State for the Home Department 




In Australia, New Zealand and the UK the original decision on refugee status is taken by a delegate of the 
Minister, who is a bureaucratic officer. If this determination is negative, the applicant can apply for a de novo 
merits review of the decision. In Australia this review is undertaken by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) 
which sits with a single member. In New Zealand this review is undertaken by the Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority (RSAA) which sits with two members. In the UK until April 2005 this review was undertaken by the 
Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA) in a two tier system: first, an immigration adjudicator reviewed the 
decision de novo and then leave could be given to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) which until 2002 
provided a second level of de novo review and after 2002 was limited to points of law by the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK). From 2005 the two-tier structure was abolished and replaced by the 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT): Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of  Claimants, etc) Act 2004 
(UK). The AIT can only grant review based on an error of law. Canada is unique in that the tribunal makes the 
first determination. Until 2002 this body was the Convention Refugee Determination Division which sat in two 
member panels, with a difference between the members resulting in a positive determination. Since 2002 the 
new Refugee Protection Division sits with only one member. Note that a new three member Refugee Appeal 
Division, contemplated by the legislation to balance this loss, has not been implemented. 
 
13 
Of course even ‘complete’ case sets are only partial. Our set comprises all available decisions, but not every 
decision made is released. For instance in Australia, while all RRT determinations were released prior to 1999, 
after that point the target for release was only 20 per cent of decided cases, and in some years fewer than 10 per 
cent of decisions have been released: see Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal Annual 
Report 2006–2007 (2007) at 18. In Canada prior to 2002 there was no obligation to provide reasons for positive 
determinations; since 2002 all decisions must have reasons but positive decisions may still be provided orally. 
An Access to Information Request A-2008-00035 (2 July 2008) to the Immigration and Review Board asking for 
the numbers of sexual orientation claims determined since 2002 revealed that in the years 2002-2006 there were 
4161 such claims determined (the Board could not provide figures for 2007 as they ceased to track claim ‘types’ 
from December 2006). Our Canadian case pool contains only 202 decisions for 2002-2006, including 81 judicial 
review decisions; thus representing less than 5 per cent of actual determinations made on sexual orientation in 
that period in Canada. 
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determinations in Canada and Australia on the basis that the applicant was not actually gay.14 
 
In later years, UK and Australian cases repeatedly described sexual orientation claims as ‘easy to 
make and impossible to disprove’.15  Unlike disbelief of other aspects of a claimant’s narrative 
(such as past persecution, where future fear of persecution may still be made out), disbelief 
regarding actual group membership will almost always doom the claim to failure: thus it is 
chosen as a key site to explore credibility assessment. 
 
 
It is easy to characterise sexual orientation claims as specific or ‘exceptional’ because they make 
up a very small minority of refugee claims worldwide, even within the PSG ground. Moreover, 
sexuality based cases do manifest unique features as a result of homophobic prejudice. Specific 
features of sexual orientation claims have been explored elsewhere as part of this research 
project, for example the reluctance of decision-makers to recognise criminal sanctions on 
homosexual sex as persecutory,16  the expectation in some receiving countries that applicants 
avoid the possibility of persecution by concealing their sexuality in their country of origin,17 the 
particular difficulty of obtaining country information on sexuality,18  and - in common with 






In Canada the proportion of decisions where the applicant’s claim of a gay, lesbian or bisexual identity was 
disbelieved rose from 7 per cent in the first phase of the study (accounting for 15 per cent of negative 
determinations) to 22 per cent of  decisions in phase 2 (accounting for 28 per cent of negative determinations). 
Australian decisions where the applicant’s claim of a gay, lesbian or bisexual identity was seriously doubted or 
disbelieved rose from 16 per cent of available cases prior to December 2003 to 38 per cent in period following: 
see Jenni Millbank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of 




See eg Krasniqi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKIAT 01TH02140 (30 August 2001) 
at  para 2;  N04/48510 [2004] RRTA 367 (17 May 2004) at  page  11 of  typescript; WAIH v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FMCA 40 (4 March 2003); SZIGI v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FMCA 1800 (20 November 2006) at para 25. Such statements did 
appear, although less frequently, in the first phase of the study:   see eg, N97/16114 [1998] RRTA 4882 (2 
November 1998) at 13. 
 
16 
See Jenni Millbank, ‘A Preoccupation with Perversion: the British Response to Refugee Claims on the Basis 
of Sexual Orientation, 1989-2003’ (2005) 14 Social and Legal Studies 115. 
 
17 
See Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank, ‘Before the High Court: Applicants S396/2002 and S395/2002, 
a Gay Refugee Couple from Bangladesh’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 97; ‘From Discretion to Disbelief’ 
above note 14. 
 
18 
See Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank, ‘Burdened by Proof: How the Australian Refugee Review 
Tribunal Has Failed Lesbian and Gay Asylum Seekers’ (2003) 31 Federal  Law Review 299. See also more 
recent research on Canada by Nicole LaViolette, ‘Independent Human Rights Documentation: A Lingering 
Challenge to Successful Refugee Claims Based on Sexual Orientation’ forthcoming (2009) 13 International 
Journal of Human Rights. 
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social and family contacts.19 Yet it is a mistake to view sexuality cases as inherently atypical or 
incapable of providing broader insights. This paper argues that sexual orientation claims can be 
utilised to explore general issues in the determination of credibility. In common with all refugee 
claims, sexuality claims rest largely upon personal testimony, involve a  major cultural gulf 
between applicant and decision-maker, difficulties and errors in communication (including but 
not limited to translation) and the challenge of speaking about painful and intensely personal 
experiences. Because the claim to group membership often rests entirely upon the applicant’s 
narrative in sexual orientation claims, with few if any external items of proof, issues of credibility 
are highlighted. Thus while this article explores credibility determination in the specific context 
of sexuality it invites consideration of how insights from this case set may be applied to refugee 
adjudication processes more broadly. 
 
 
Tribunals in all of the jurisdictions under discussion make reference to the ‘ring of truth’ in 
numerous determinations, usually (but not exclusively) in assessing testimony that is disbelieved. 
What exactly it is that ‘rings’ true or untrue is rarely explicated. The term ‘ring of truth’ is a 
fascinating one because it posits the story itself as the active agent in the adjudication process and 
suggests that its truth is both self-contained and self-evident. It is the story that signals (or 
‘rings’) its own truthfulness, rather than the decision-maker who is choosing (based on evidence, 
instinct, emotion, or a combination) to believe, or to disbelieve, in it or the person telling it. This 
notion of truth as objective and discoverable by a decision-maker who is a fact ‘finder’ —  rather 
than, say, a probability estimator, one who knows that their state of knowledge can only ever be 
imperfect and who weighs various possibilities and decides to give or withhold the benefit of the 




The UNHCR Handbook states that it is unlikely that refugees will be able to prove every aspect 
of their claim and that they should be given the ‘benefit of the doubt’.20 The Handbook adds that 
the benefit of the doubt should only be given if the examiner is ‘satisfied as to the applicant’s 




See Jenni Millbank, ‘Imagining Otherness: Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexuality in Canada and Australia’ 
(2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 144; ‘Gender, Sex and Visibility in Refugee Claims on the Basis of 
Sexual Orientation’ (2003) 18 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 71. A later article from this project will 
examine claims of forced marriage as a harm in refugee law. 
 
20 
UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Handbook) (1992 edition) at para 203. 
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must not run counter to generally known facts’.21 As a result, guidelines on credibility assessment 
in many receiving nations centre the idea of a ‘coherent and plausible’ account22 – although they 
have notably been less  enthusiastic about importing the ‘benefit of the doubt’ standard upon 
which it rests.23 (In fact numerous commentators contend that in practice there has been 
consistent neglect of the ‘benefit of the doubt’ principle in lower level decision-making.24) 
Audrey Macklin, a refugee scholar and former member of the Canadian tribunal, contends that 
‘consistency, plausibility and demeanour’ are the primary tools which decision makers use to 
determine credibility.25    Although such factors are at times inter-related, the role that each of 
these three factors – demeanour, consistency and plausibility — has played in the case law is 
explored below in order to ground discussion of the issues with recent concrete examples. The 
article then goes on to examine avenues to improve the practice of credibility assessment, 
including measures such as structuring decision-maker discretion through the use of guidelines 







Id at para 204. 
 
22  
See Home Office (UK), Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility in Asylum and Human Rights Claims 
(c2007) at 3, available from 
http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/ (accessed  12 
November 2008). The Canadian Guidelines state that, ‘An important indicator of credibility is the consistency 
with which a witness has told a particular story. The RPD may also take into account matters such as the 
plausibility  of  the  evidence  and  the  claimant’s  demeanour’:  Refugee  Protection  Division,  Assessment of 
Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection (2004) at para 1.1. The Australian Guidelines refer to ‘what is 
objectively or reasonably believable’ and the ‘overall consistency and coherence’ of a claim: Australian 
Government,  Migration  Review Tribunal  and  Refugee  Review  Tribunal,  Guidance  on  the  Assessment of 
Credibility (2006, updated 2008) at paras 2.4 and 5.2. See also EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum 
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as 




For example the UK Asylum Instructions state only that the decision-maker should consider giving the benefit 
of the doubt: id at 9. The reproduction of the ‘benefit of the doubt’ principle in the Canadian credibility 
guidelines is followed by a lengthy discussion of when that approach is not applicable: Refugee Protection 
Division, id at para 1.3. The use of double negatives in the Australian credibility guidelines is suggestive of a 
reluctance to embrace the principle: ‘if the Tribunal is not able to make a confident finding that an Applicant’s 
account is not credible, it must make its assessment on the basis that it is possible, although not certain, that the 
Applicant’s account of past events is true’: Australian Government, id at para 2.6. See also Robert Thomas, 
‘Assessing the Credibility of Asylum Claims: EU and UK Approaches Examined’ (2006) 8 European Journal of 




See eg Kneebone above note 2; Sophia Ceneda and Clare Palmer, ‘“Lip Service” or Implementation? The 
Home Office Gender Guidance and Women’s Asylum Claims in the UK’, Asylum Aid Report (2006) at para 
6.1; Asylum Aid, Submission of Evidence to the Independent Asylum Commission, 2007, recommendation 6. 
 
25 
Macklin, above note 1 at 137. See also Peter Showler’s illuminating fictionalized accounts of refugee cases in 
Canada, Refugee Sandwich (2006). 
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Although it is widely accepted that demeanour is an unreliable guide in assessing truthfulness,26 
most especially in instances of cross-cultural communication,27  it is clear that decision-makers 
continue to rely upon it. The Canadian guidelines on credibility distinguish between subjective 
‘impressions’ based upon physical appearance on the one hand (which it states ought not be 
relied upon), and what are characterised as ‘objective’ elements of demeanour such as ‘frankness 
and spontaneity’ in providing an oral narrative.28 Yet it is not at all certain that a clear distinction 
between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ elements of demeanour can be drawn, or that the latter can 
justifiably be regarded as a reliable guide to truthfulness. 
 
 
While overt reliance upon the applicant’s appearance as the basis upon which he or she was 
determined to be a member of the social group was far less likely to appear in written reasons in 
the later years of the study compared to the first few years in which claims were being made, 
physical appearance and perception of manner continue to play a role. When statements about 
appearance were made in decisions they were more commonly for the purpose of affirming the 
applicant’s claimed identity rather than disbelieving it.29  Yet this does raise the possibility that 
decision-makers were also considering appearance for both negative and positive assessments of 
credibility without disclosing it in their reasons. (It is notable that in copies of expedited reports 
from the Canadian tribunal which, in contrast to reasoned decisions, are not intended for public 
release,30 refugee protection officers made assessments in recent years such as ‘no signs of being 




The Australian credibility guidelines provide that the Tribunal should ‘exercise care’ if making adverse 
credibility findings on the basis of demeanour: Australian Government above note 22 at para 6.1. 
 
27 
See eg Kagan above note 2. 
 
28 
Refugee Protection Division above note 22 at para 2.3.7. 
 
29 




Obtained under an Access to Information Request A-2008-00037 (7 July 2008). 
 
31 
TA4-04080 (18 January 2005), Refugee Protection Office (RPO) Observations. Decision not publicly 
available, on file with author (ultimately positive to the claimant at hearing). 
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Canada and elsewhere on the error of using appearance as a basis for assessing group 
membership,34 occasional negative determinations based on appearance continued to be made at 
tribunal level. For instance in a 2007 Australian case the tribunal decided that from their ‘manner 
towards each other’ the applicant and a claimed partner were friends and not lovers,35  and in a 
2003 Canadian case an applicant who self-identified as ‘effeminate’ was described as appearing 
 
‘less effeminate’ at the end of the day than he was at the beginning.36    However such decisions 
were exceptions to the general trend. 
 
 
More commonly, the so-called ‘objective’ elements of demeanour were influential in determining 
credibility.37  Decision-makers routinely interpreted hesitation or lack of detail in an applicant’s 
response to questioning as indications of falsehood.38 This is particularly troubling when the 
questions being asked involve what one tribunal member acknowledged are: 
private issues of self-identity and sexual conduct, and sometimes personal issues for 
individuals that may be stressful or unresolved. Social, cultural and religious attitudes to 
homosexuality in an applicant’s society may exacerbate such problems.39 
 
Claimants on the basis of sexual orientation will often have feelings of shame and self-hatred or 
internalized homophobia40   and  so  may  find  answering  questions about  their  sexuality  very 




TA4-13131 (29 July 2005), RPO Observations (also includes the comment ‘Female interpreter noted his great 
taste in colour coordination and fashion’). Decision not publicly available, on file with author (positive decision 
made on the papers, without hearing). 
 
33 
TA5-02888 (26 July 2005), RPO Observations. Decision not publicly available, on file with author (positive 
decision made on the papers). 
 
34  
Herrera  v Canada  [2005] FCJ No 1499 (6 September 2005) (holding that this finding gave rise to both 
appearance of bias and patent unreasonableness). See also Lekaj v Canada [2006] FCJ No 1151 (14 June 2006). 
 
35 
SZKIS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1223 (18 July 2007) at para 31, citing RRT 
decision of 13 February 2007 (not publicly available). 
 
36 
Re JWB [2003] RPDD No 141 (17 March 2003) at para 40. 
 
37 
This was also found by Guy Coffey in his review of 50 Australian tribunal decisions in which credibility was a 
serious issue: above note 5 at 386. 
 
38  
See eg Khrystych v Canada [2004] RPDD No 339 (15 April 2004) and subsequent judicial review decision 
Khrystych v Canada [2005] FCJ No 624 (11 April 2005); Nnaakirya v Canada [2004] RPDD No 457 (7 July 
2004); Ochirkhuyag v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 02991 (24 July 2002). 
 
39 
071397909 [2007] RRTA 187 (15 August 2007). 
 
40  
See Laurie Berg and Jenni Millbank, ‘Constructing the Personal Narratives of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual 
Asylum Claimants’ forthcoming. 
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and/or when being posed by an authority figure. Additionally, if the translator is a member of the 
same small community in the receiving country and/or is a member of the opposite sex, the 
applicant’s willingness to make disclosures can be seriously compromised.41  All of these 
constraints profoundly affect the process of eliciting information. In our study we found that 
these issues, even if noted in argument or reasons, were not always adequately taken into account 
by decision-makers when assessing narratives that were ‘halting’, ‘vague’ or ‘evasive’.42 
 
 
Disturbingly,  there  were  numerous  cases  in  which  tribunal  members  asked  the  applicant 
questions during the course of the hearing that were specifically about sexual acts43  and then 
made adverse credibility findings based upon a lack of detailed or free flowing response.44  This 





See eg N01/37352 [2001] RRTA 381 (24 April 2001) at 4; N01/37891 [2001] RRTA 889 (16 October 2001) at 
9. In 2008 the Australian tribunal amended its credibility guidelines to include sexual orientation as a reason to 
consider ‘whether it would be appropriate for an interpreter of a particular gender to assist with the hearing’: 
Australian Government, Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal, Guidance on the Assessment 
of Credibility (2006, updated 2008) at para 4.5. Note, however, that there is no obligation upon the Tribunal to 
respond to a request that an interpreter (or Tribunal member) be a designated gender. 
 
42 
See cases above note 41; see also N04/50078 [2004] RRTA 778 (8 December 2004). 
 
43  
See eg N01/37891 [2001] RRTA 889 (16 October 2001). In another Australian case the applicant was 
peppered with detailed questions about his visit to a male-male sex-on-premises venue, focusing upon the 
applicant’s experience and recollection of the changing room because, in the tribunal’s words, ‘What happens 
after that is potentially sensitive and individual’: N05/50659 [2005] RRTA 207 (17 May 2005) at 11. Yet it 
appears from the transcript submitted on judicial review that the tribunal did in fact proceed to ask repeatedly 
about what occurred ‘after your shower’: SZGNJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs [2006] FMCA 91 (24 February 2006) at para 11. See also the UK see Sarfrazy v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2002] UKIAT 00540 (1 March 2002) at para 25 where ‘the appellant has never said what 
specific acts were recorded in the videos’. See also a recent Australian case in which the applicant claimed that 
he had met men in on-line dating websites; his reluctance to provide the tribunal member during the hearing with 
his login name and password (which would possibly have revealed on-line conversation of a sexual nature) was 




See eg Leke v Canada  [2007] FCJ No 1108 (22 August 2007) stating the findings of the IRB: ‘during 
testimony the applicant was reticent to describe explicitly the intimate sexual act he and Kunle Oba were 
performing when the landlord forced himself into the apartment and caught them in the act’ (at para 10, judicial 
review granted on other grounds). In NAIK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
[2003] FMCA 400 (1 September 2003) the applicant was disbelieved because he was ‘halting’ and ‘evasive’ 
when questioned about ‘critical issues’ in his testimony which appear to centre upon being discovered engaged 
in gay sex   (RRT decision not publicly available). See also Mahmood v Canada  [2003] RPDD No 636 (18 
November 2003) at para 21, where the applicant’s evidence of his first sexual experience (of male-male sexual 
assault) was not given in a ‘straight-forward’ or detailed manner. 
 
45 
In an early Australian case the applicant claimed he had made a video involving himself and others in sex acts; 
this was discredited on the basis that his oral evidence ‘lacks important detail, for example about the nature and 
type of sexual activity on the video, who was involved in specific activities’: N97/15882 [1997] RRTA 3396 (5 
September 1997) at 7; judicial review denied subsequently in SZEOE v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous   Affairs [2004] FMCA 1096 (16 December 2004) and SZEOE v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous  Affairs [2005] FCA 694 (31 May 2005).  See also Magradze v 
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case, a 45 year old male claimant from the Ukraine was found to be ‘vague and hesitant in his 
testimony with respect to his experiences as a homosexual person’.46 In that case, it appears that 
the applicant was repeatedly questioned by a female tribunal member about ‘how the situation 
developed from an invitation to tea to that of sexual intimacy’.47   (At the other end of the 
spectrum, in two cases decided in 2004 – one in Australia and one in Canada – an applicant and 
witness respectively were disbelieved in their claims to be gay because they were considered too 
relaxed and jovial in manner when giving evidence.48) These findings are extremely problematic 
for sexual orientation claims and also do not augur well for the sensitivity or appropriateness of 





Findings correlating hesitation in responding to questions with dishonesty rest on the implicit 
faith of decision-makers in their own ability to read non-verbal cues in a highly stressful cross- 
cultural setting. In a 2005 New Zealand case the applicant, an Iranian man in this late 30s, was 
‘initially unable to respond’ to a question about what sexual activity took place at parties he held 
and ‘became visibly shaken’ when he was ‘prompted that one such activity might have been oral 
sex’.49 When asked about his own sexual acts, the applicant responded ‘with head bowed’ that he 
could not talk about it.50 The tribunal noted that ‘acceptance of one’s sexuality can present 
enormous challenges and that, even accepted, it can remain an intensely private matter’.51 Yet the 
decision-maker went on to hold that these possibilities 
 
do  not  explain  the  appellant’s  sudden  paralysis  when  asked  to  give  even  a  general 
description of the homosexual activities in which he claims to have regularly engaged with a 
number of other people over a fourteen year period…Far from bashfulness, the inarticulate 
 
Canada [2006] FCJ No 35 (11 January 2006) at para 6: ‘it was open to the Board to draw a negative inference 
from the Applicant’s inability to clearly describe his sexual activities with his alleged lover in Georgia’. 
 
46 
Kravchenko v Canada [2004] RPDD No 384 (9 February 2004) at para 8. 
 
47  
Kravchenko v Canada [2004] RPDD No 384 (9 February 2004) at para 12. The decision was overturned on 
judicial review for other reasons: Kravchenko v Canada [2005] FCJ No 479 (17 March 2005). 
 
48  
N04/48510 [2004] RRTA 367 (17 May 2004). Moreover in the Canadian case the witness was asked by the 
board what kind of condoms he used and his answer was then dismissed on the basis that a heterosexual man 
would be equally able to provide such information - begging the question why such personal information was 
requested in the first place: Hussain v Canada [2004] RPDD No 732 (17 September 2004) at para 37. 
 
49 
NZ Refugee Appeal No 74151 (2 December 2005) at para 39. 
 
50 
Id at para 40. 
 
51 
Id at para 41. 
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response of the appellant suggested, instead, distaste at the prospect of describing that 




While being visibly shaken, inarticulate, non-responsive and bowing one’s head may indeed be a 
betrayal of ‘distaste’, it seems at least equally possible that such elements of demeanour may 
evince ‘bashfulness’ or shame. The degree of confidence expressed by the decision-maker in 
being able to clearly distinguish between such emotional states, in a compete stranger, is very 
troubling in this instance. 
 
In 2008 amendments to credibility guidelines used by the Australian tribunal included the proviso 
that, ‘The Tribunal should be mindful that an applicant may find it particularly difficult or 
embarrassing to discuss claims relation [sic] to his or her sexual orientation’.53 While such 
acknowledgement is a positive step, it is notable that the guidelines still do not address the 
conduct of the Tribunal in response to such inhibition or embarrassment; they do not, for 
example, provide that sexually explicit questions should be avoided where possible, or make any 




Nicole LaViolette contends that questions about the personal experience of being gay or lesbian 
provide the ‘strongest basis’ for assessing credibility as to group membership.54 Such questioning, 
however,  must  take  place  within  an  appropriate  framework:  one  which  excludes  intensely 
personal inquiry, such as detail of sexual activities, and which is sensitive to the barriers in 
articulating such experience. It must also include sensitivity to the barriers that exist in receiving 
such narratives when they do not match the cultural experiences or expectations of the decision- 
maker.55 Our research found a disturbing number of cases in which decision-makers appeared to 
have a pre-formed expectation of how gay, lesbian or bisexual sexual identity is understood, 
experienced  and  expressed  by  applicants  from  a  widely  diverse  range  of  cultures  and 






Id at para 41. 
 
53 
Above note 22 at para 4.6. 
 
54 
Nicole LaViolette, ‘Sexual Orientation and the Refugee Determination Process: Questioning a Claimant about 
their Membership in the Particular Social Group’, prepared for the Immigration and Refugee Board (2004) at 5. 
 
55 
Marita Eastmond, ‘Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research’ (2007) 20 Journal 






Consistency may be either internal or external to a narrative.56 Internal consistency is the extent 
to which the series of statements made by the applicant through the process — to border guards 
or at an initial interview, in the written statement that forms the basis of the claim and in oral 
statements during the hearing — sit comfortably with each other without contradiction. In 
keeping with other studies we found a strong emphasis in decisions upon the extent to which the 
applicant’s oral narrative in the hearing correlated with earlier claims.57 
 
 
External consistency is the extent to which the applicant’s narrative is contradicted by knowledge 
and actions outside the narrative, such as the applicant’s own behaviour or history and also what 
the UNHCR calls ‘generally known facts’,58 such as those drawn from country information 
sources: that is, the extent to which the story matches what is known of the applicant and of the 
world at large. External consistency assessment which draws upon general information thus blurs 
into the realm of ‘plausibility’, and some issues raised here could be characterised under either 
head. However ‘plausibility’ assessment may also be based upon what is speculated upon or 
imagined to be likely, rather than upon actual evidence of what has occurred or evidence of 
general conditions that inform the likelihood of an occurrence. Accordingly, plausibility is 
considered separately in the next section of the article. 
 
 
In a Swedish study exploring attitudes to truth-telling, the authors concluded that refugee 
decision-makers are heavily reliant upon consistency to establish reliability of claims.59  Sixty- 
seven migration board members (who are first instance decision-makers in the Swedish system) 
were asked both closed and open questions about factors in credibility assessment. Sixty per cent 




In the UK, credibility guidelines which guide the decision-making of low level bureaucratic officers expressly 
utilise the framework of internal and external consistency, see above note 22. 
 
57  
See eg Kneebone above note 2 at 82, Amnesty International UK, Get it Right: How Home Office Decision 
Making Fails Refugees (2004) at 20; Coffey above note 5 at 388-9; Kagan above note 2 at 386. 
 
58 
UNHCR Handbook above note 20 at para 204. 
 
59 
Pär Anders Granhag, Leif Strömwall and Maria Hartwig, ‘Granting Asylum or Not? Migration Board 
Personnel’s Beliefs about Deception’ (2005) 31 Journal  of  Ethnic and  Migration Studies 29. The authors 
express concern as they argue that existing research demonstrates that ‘deceptive consecutive statements are 
consistent to at least the same extent as truthful ones’, at 43, and moreover board members received no training 
in how to strategically use case-specific facts during investigative interviews, at 46. 
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truthful ones.60 In addition in response to the open ended questions, ‘Do you have any rules of 
thumb for distinguishing between liars and truth tellers?’ and ‘Which factors are the most 
important when are to make a reliability assessment?’, the second most common response to 
both was contradictions.61  In a public submission in 2000 to a parliamentary inquiry, the Australian 
tribunal also repeatedly emphasised consistency as the basis for credibility determinations.62 Yet 
decision-makers themselves acknowledge that contradiction is inevitable in virtually every case.63 
 
 
When assessing inconsistency in details within a refugee narrative, several important 
considerations about memory and recall ought to frame value judgements about whether 
inconsistency is meaningful, that is, whether it bears any relation at all to truthfulness. First, general 
research on memory clearly demonstrates that matters experienced by the teller as core rather 
than peripheral are more likely to be accurately recalled over time. Secondly, stress and trauma 
have a demonstrably negative effect on the ability to recall events, as do other forms of mood 
depression. Thirdly, with the passage of time, recall declines.64 These general conclusions on 
memory have all been confirmed in recent clinical research that specifically explores variations in 
autobiographical narratives by refugees. In a clinical study, a group of British psychologists 
looked at repeated interviews given by Kosovar Albanians and Bosnians who had already been 
granted leave to remain in the UK (so no outcome hinged upon the content or consistency of the 
stories). Discrepancies between two autobiographical accounts given by the same individual on 




Id at 39.  Interestingly, this figure was higher than the ‘control’ group of non-decision makers, comprised of 
students, of whom 53.8 per cent agreed. 
 
61   
These  were  21  per  cent  and  18  per  cent  of  responses,  respectively.  The  number  one  answers  were, 
respectively, ‘No’ and ‘If known facts correspond with the statement of the asylum seeker’: id at 40. 
 
62  
Parliament of Australia, Senate, ‘A Sanctuary Under Review: An Examination of Australia’s Refugee and 
Humanitarian Process’ (2000) at para 5.62: ‘The RRT makes an assessment of the applicant’s credibility by: 
• examining any inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims; 
• determining  whether  new  claims  are  raised  at  a  hearing  that  were  not  included  in  the  written 
application; 
• determining whether there are any inconsistencies with known conditions in the applicant’s country of 
origin; and 
• assessing the general plausibility of the applicant’s story.’ 
 
See  also  Coffey’s review  of  50  Australian cases  on  credibility,  finding  that  inconsistency was  the  most 
significant factor in negative determinations: above note 5 at 388, fn 69. 
 
63 
Cécile Rousseau and Patricia Foxen, ‘Constructing and Deconstructing the Myth of the Lying Refugee’ in Els 
van Dongen and Sylvie Fainzang (eds), Lying and Illness (2005) at 74. 
 
64   
For  an  overview  of  such  research,  see  eg  Jane  Herlihy,  ‘Evidentiary  Assessment  and  Psychological 
Difficulties’ in Noll (ed) above note 3. 
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which participants considered peripheral rather than central. For the group with high post- 
traumatic stress, the length of time between interviews significantly raised the discrepancy rates. 
This study suggests that using inconsistency as a key criterion for assessing credibility is likely to 
lead  to  erroneous  conclusions of  deception  in  cases  where  applicants  have  suffered  post- 
traumatic stress and delays in the assessment of their claims.65 
 
 
Given that the experience of trauma and the passage of considerable time between events in the 
home country and adjudication of the claim are common, even ubiquitous, features of refugee 
claims,  consistency  in  relating  minor  aspects  of  narratives  should  perhaps  be  seen  as  the 
exception rather than the ‘rule’ against which truthfulness is judged. Yet the equation of 
consistency with truthfulness was prevalent in our study, including in cases where the 
inconsistency was of a relatively minor or peripheral nature.66 A stunning example arose in a 2005 
Canadian decision in which the applicant recalled an incident that had occurred two years earlier. 
 
In his original written claim he stated that his attackers were behind a gate; in later oral testimony 
he said that he was behind a high fence. The tribunal held that these statements were inconsistent 
and placed significant emphasis on this inconsistency because, in the face of all research to the 
contrary, ‘given the alleged traumatic nature of the incident, it was reasonable to expect the 
claimant to relate a clear and consistent tale at all times’.67 
 
 




A fundamental but untested assumption of refugee adjudication is that claimants in genuine fear 
of persecution will make their claim at the earliest possible opportunity and as fulsomely as 




Jane Herlihy, Peter Scragg and Stuart Turner, ‘Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories – Implications for 
the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: Repeated Interview Studies’ (2002) 324 British Medical Journal 324. 
 
66  
See also the findings of Amnesty International UK that decision-makers often focus on minor detail when 
finding that credibility is impugned by inconsistency, above note 57 at 19-29; similar conclusions are drawn in a 
review of Australian tribunal decisions: Kneebone above note 2 at 93. In their review of 40 negative decisions in 
Canada, Rousseau et al suggest that emphasis on factual information not relevant to the claim by decision- 




TA4-13566 [2005] CanLII 59997 (15 March 2005) at 9. 
 
68  
See eg, EU Council Directive 2005/85/EC on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for 
Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status (1 December 2005) (the EU Asylum Procedures Directive), Article 
11(2)(a) and the EU Refugee Qualification Directive, above note 22, Article 4(1), providing that Member states 
may consider it is the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the 
application for international protection. 
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suspicion because they are seen as inconsistent. Guidelines on credibility (and others on gender 
or torture) commonly draw decision-makers’ attention to ‘exceptions’ to this general approach, 
rather than actually displacing the expectation.69 
 
 
Interestingly, although delay was relatively commonplace in sexuality claims, it was rarely a major 
factor in negative determinations. In general, decision makers carefully considered the reasons for 
late claims involving homosexuality, including whether applicants (and their advisers) were 
unaware that sexuality was recognised in the receiving country as the basis of a PSG claim,70  as 
well as applicants’ reluctance to reveal such information to authority figures.71 Some cases 
specifically  acknowledged  applicants’  feelings  of  shame,  emotional  turmoil  or  ‘shyness’  in 
revealing their sexuality.72  While claims of homosexuality that were raised by an applicant only 
after a negative determination on another ground were treated with greater scrutiny,73 this was not 
an unreasonable approach and did not always lead to rejection of the claim.74 
 
However there was still a small cohort of cases in which delay in raising sexual orientation in the 





See eg the UK guidelines which under ‘Internal credibility’ include a subsection entitled ‘Mitigating 
circumstances’ which lists ‘mental or emotional trauma, inarticulateness, fear, mistrust of authorities, feelings of 
shame, painful memories particularly those of a sexual nature’ and adds in brackets ‘For further guidance see the 




See eg NZ Refugee Appeal No 1312/93 (30 August 1995). 
 
71 
See eg NZ Refugee Appeal No 1856/93 (25 April 1996); NZ Refugee Appeal No 74665/03 (7 July 2004). In 
addition Canadian decision makers accepted that applicants had not make claims in the US en route to Canada 
due to its less progressive attitude to claims on the basis of sexual orientation: see eg MA3-10913 [2004] CanLII 
56776 (7 May 2004); Re EYW [2000] CRDD No 116 (7 June 2000). Such claims would no longer be heard in 
Canada as a consequence of the US-Canada safe-third country agreement: see eg Audrey Macklin, ‘Disappearing 
Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement’ (2005) 36 Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review 365. 
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See eg NZ Refugee Appeal No 74946 (8 September 2004) at para 17; NZ Refugee Appeal No 75272 (16 May 
2006) at para 66. 
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See eg NZ Refugee Appeal No AAS 71779/99 (29 December 1999); Nyaoma v Canada [2004] RPDD No 446 
(18 May 2004) at para 17; and in the UK Ochirkhuyag v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 
UKIAT 02991 (24 July 2002). 
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See eg R (on the application of S) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 352 (10 
February 2003); R (on the application of Mbasvi) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2001] EWHC Admin 891 (15 
October 2001); Krasniqi v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKAIT 01TH02140 (30 
August 2001) (adjudicator has disbelieved claim based on timing). 
16  
Decision-makers in the UK did not pay proper regard to the fact that sexual orientation remained 
controversial as the basis for a claim in that country for several years. Indeed the Home Office 
vigorously  opposed  homosexuality  as  a  PSG  ground  in  early  cases,76   and  appears  to  be 
maintaining this opposition.77 This environment impeded the ability of claimants to raise the issue 
of sexual orientation early in their claims78  and in earlier years reduced the likelihood of that 
aspect of their claim being recorded in the initial interview.79  Decision makers in the UK were 
also demonstrably less sensitive than those elsewhere to the prospect that a refugee claimant on 
the basis of sexual orientation may not be able, or may not feel able, to make their claim in 
another country en route. For example in a 2001 case, the adjudicator found that the applicant 
from Iran was more likely an economic migrant than an asylum seeker because he had not 
attempted to claim refugee status on the basis of homosexuality in Turkey.80 
 
 




A wealth of social science research and literature attests to the complexity of sexual identity 
development.81  Yet in the refugee context the expectation that sexual orientation is a fixed or 
finite quality, settled upon early and immovable thereafter, has supported adverse inferences on 
credibility when asylum seekers have engaged in heterosexual relationships which are seen as 





See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Binbasi [1989] Imm AR 595 (25 July 1989). 
 
77 
See eg the argument of the Home Office that, absent evidence of persecution, homosexuals cannot constitute a 
PSG because they are not a ‘cohesive group’ in Re Stuk [2005] ScotsCS CSOH 30 (18 February 2005). 
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R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Arku [1997] Queen’s Bench Division (Crown Office 
List) FC 3 97/7256/D (19 December 1997) regarding a claim filed in 1992.  See also a 2002 Canadian decision 
in which failure to raise sexual orientation in a claim originally made in 1992 (although then not an established 
group) was held adverse to the applicant: Re PUY  [2002] CRDD No 47 (17 April 2002), contrary to earlier 
decisions such as Re EYW [2000] CRDD No 116 (7 June 2000). 
 
79  
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Metanie [1998] UKAIT 17170 (21 May 1998) regarding an 
interview conducted in 1991: ‘He asserts that he told the interviewing officer about it but was in turn told that it 
was not a necessary or relevant part of his claim. …We do not accept that the interviewing officer would have 
disregarded, or omitted a matter of substance raised in the course of the interview. There has for some time been 
an issue whether homosexuality could give rise to a claim under the Convention and we are confident that if the 
matter had been raised, then it would have been recorded’, at 2. 
 
80  




For an overview, see Berg and Millbank, above note 40. 
 
82 
See eg 071204626 [2007] RRTA 146 (13 August 2007); N05/51729 [2005] RRTA 311 (8 November 2005); 
N02/42894 [2003] RRTA 1093 (14 November 2003); Khrystych v Canada  [2004] RPDD No 339 (15 April 
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In Canada the Federal Court has cautioned against simplistic and essentialised notions of sexual 
identity in numerous cases. For example, in the 2006 case of Leke the Canadian tribunal held that 
a claimant from Nigeria could not be gay because he had married and it was ‘highly improbable’ 
that a homosexual would father two sons. The Federal Court of Canada overturned this decision, 
holding that the tribunal had erred in ignoring the wealth of evidence on the need to live a double 
life in Nigeria.84  Likewise in 2006 the Canadian tribunal revoked refugee status from a woman 
who had previously been recognised as a lesbian refugee on the basis that her later marriage to a 
man indicated it was a fraudulent claim.85  The Federal Court noted in its judgment that, ‘The 
human race is extremely complex, particularly when it comes to the sexuality of its members’ and, 
in overturning the decision, held that the bare fact of a subsequent heterosexual relationship did 
not establish that the applicant’s claim to being lesbian was false at the time it was made.86 
 
 
A number of commentators have noted a tendency of decision-makers to search for, or seize 
upon,  inconsistencies in  the  applicant’s  narrative  –  even  those  of  an  apparently  trivial  or 
peripheral nature – to doubt the veracity of the claim.87 In the UK this approach has been 
characterised as a manifestation of a ‘culture of disbelief’ in the refugee determination system.88 
In addition to this ‘culture of disbelief’, it was apparent from the case reports that decision- 
makers did not always take time within the hearing to explore with the applicants inconsistencies 




2004); Davydyan v Canada [2004] RPDD No 288 (28 July 2004) at para 17; Ochirkhuyag v The Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 02991 (24 July 2002). 
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See eg NZ Refugee Appeal No 73252/02 (24 December 2002) at paras 8, 10, 30 and 35. 
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Leke v Canada [2007] FCJ No 1108 (26 July 2007) at para 20. 
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MA6-02300 [2006] CanLII 61623 (IRB) (27 September 2006). 
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See, respectively: Amnesty International UK above note 57; Rousseau and Foxen above note 63 at 64-65; 
Coffey above note 5; Kneebone above note 2. 
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See eg: Amnesty International UK above note 57; Ceneda and Palmer above note 24. 
 
89 
See eg WAIH v Minister for Immigration [2003] FMCA 40 (4 March 2003). See also Coffey’s review of 50 
Australian cases: above note 5 at 388. 
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required by classic considerations of natural justice as well as the UNHCR exhortation that the 
burden of fact-finding be shared between applicant and decision-maker.90  UNHCR Procedural 
Standards provide that as a general principle a negative credibility finding should not be made 







Both Amnesty and UNHCR have stringently criticised initial bureaucratic decision-makers in the 
UK for frequently relying upon assumption or inference as to how people would behave in 
certain situations in making ‘plausibility’ judgments.92 There were numerous examples of this kind 
of speculative reasoning in tribunal level decisions in all of the countries under review. For 
example, in a Canadian case from 2000 a woman claimed that her sexuality was exposed when 
her husband, who was intoxicated, came to her work and confronted her about her lesbianism. 
The tribunal held that this claim was not plausible because no one would have believed the 
husband if he were drunk.93  The difficulty with much ‘plausibility’ assessment is that it arises 
from assumptions about what is real or likely, and may rest far more upon speculation than upon 
evidence. This difficulty is exacerbated in sexual orientation claims because there is rarely any 
external form of proof of group membership. Moreover, even when available, evidence such as 
photographs of lovers, membership of lesbian and gay community groups, or testimony by 
counsellor, is  often  disregarded as  self-serving or  staged.94   Thus,  overwhelmingly, it  is  the 
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See UNHCR, Quality Initiative Report, 3
rd  
Report, 2006, Section 2.3.6-2.3.7; Amnesty International UK 
above note 57 at 19. 
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Re PTF [2000] CRDD No 117 (11 May 2000) at para 5, upheld on judicial review in Valoczki v Canada 
[2004] FCJ No 612 (1 April 2004). 
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See eg N05/50659 [2005] RRTA 207 (17 May 2005); Yakovenko v Canada [2004] RPDD No 267 (22 January 
2004); Re PTF [2000] CRDD No 117 (11 May 2000); TA5-12778 [2006] CanLII 61444 (IRB) (28 October 
2006) at 8; Osayamwen v Canada [2004] RPDD No 655 (22 July 2004) at para 18; Cole v Canada [2004] RPDD 
No 854 (1 December 2004) at para 29; Re GPC [2003] RPDD No 444 (16 September 2003) at para 11; Re GYJ 
[2001] CRDD No 46 (17 May 2001) at para 6; Davydyan v Canada [2004] RPDD No 288 (28 July 2004) at para 
24. 
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Nicole LaViolette argues that, ‘There is no uniform way in which lesbians and gay men recognize 
and act on their sexual orientation’.95 Given this divergence, it is worth considering what exactly 
constitutes a ‘plausible’ account of a homosexual self identity. In training materials that she 
developed for the Canadian tribunal, LaViolette suggests three areas of inquiry: (i) Personal and 
Family, (ii) Lesbian and Gay Contacts in both sending and receiving countries, and (iii) 
Experience/Knowledge of Discrimination and Persecution.96  Most importantly LaViolette 
suggests a series of open-ended questions that invite the applicant to tell their narrative of how 
they came to their own self knowledge or experience of ‘difference’, how they felt about it and 
how others reacted. Yet the exploration of lesbian and gay contacts in particular was misapplied 
in practice, as decision-makers based their determination of plausibility on broad over- 
generalisations or stereotypes of gay culture or ‘lifestyle’, tellingly expressed in one Canadian case 
as ‘the gay reality’.97 
 
 
In a notorious 2001 Australian case the decision-maker repeatedly asked the applicant, who was 
from Iran, about his identification with popular culture, including Oscar Wilde, an Egyptian gay 
novelist, and his familiarly with the works of Freud (deemed ‘negligible’98), in the process of 
deciding that he was not in fact gay.99  Unusually, the applicant was successful in a claim for 
judicial review on the very difficult ground of actual bias, as the court held that the questions 
revealed ‘a pre-formed template into which the Tribunal considered all homosexual males would 
fit’ and a ‘completely closed’ approach to the issue.100  The government then appealed and the 
tribunal decision was reinstated as the Full Federal Court held it was a ‘matter of common sense’ 
and ‘perfectly legitimate’ to test a claim ‘by reference to knowledge or attitudes which members 





Nicole LaViolette, ‘Coming Out to Canada: The Immigration of Same-Sex Couples under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act’ (2004) 49 McGill Law Journal 969 at 996. 
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Re KQH [2003] RPDD No 136 (19 February 2003) at para 11. 
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This was quoted by both Heydon J and Gummow J in the leave to appeal transcript WAAG v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCATrans 475 (19 November 2004) at 6. 
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Quoted on review in WAAG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] 
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WAAG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FMCA 191 (30 August 
2002) at para 23. 
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Minister  for  Immigration  and  Multicultural  and  Indigenous  Affairs  v  SBAN [2002]  FCAFC  431  (18 
December 2002) at para 65 (emphasis added). 
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the applicant was successful in obtaining leave to appeal to the High of Australia in 2004 that the 
government agreed to remit the case back for redetermination (whereupon refugee status was 




While this is an extreme example, it unfortunately does not stand alone. In numerous cases, 
particularly in Australia, and to a lesser extent in Canada,  decision makers appeared to test the 
veracity of applicants’ claims to homosexual identity by asking about their familiarity with the gay 
‘scene’ in the receiving country. This involved repeated and often detailed questioning about the 
 
names and street addresses of gay nightclubs,103 betraying the expectation that same-sex attracted 
individuals from elsewhere in the world should know about and visit gay bars and clubs as a 
matter of course upon their relocation.104 This expectation involves a two-fold assumption: this is 
what our gay people do, therefore your doing likewise is proof of gayness, and also: if you have 
come from a place of oppression/covert experience of your sexuality then the inevitable outcome 
of relocating should be enthusiastic engagement in cultural manifestations of gayness because 
that is how ‘freedom’ is expressed. The objections that spring to mind traverse both structural 
barriers and individual preference. Claimants who have really suffered as a result of their sexuality 
may find the prospect of publicly-identifiable gay venues appalling rather than liberating, they 
may be suffering from depression or PTSD as a result of their experiences such that clubbing is 
not high on their list of priorities, may find such venues inaccessible or unpleasant for many 
reasons including their expense105 and the cultural and language barriers to meeting or relating to 
other people there. (Alternatively, they may simply be plain old home-bodies who don’t enjoy 
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See eg in Australia: N04/48953 [2005] RRTA 363 (25 January 2005); N05/50659 [2005] RRTA 207 (17 May 
2005); N03/45493 [2003] RRTA 303 (2 April 2003); SZIXG v Minister for Immigration and  Multicultural 
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review: Cole v Canada [2006] FCJ 199 (8 February 2006); Akhtar v Canada [2004] RPDD No 804 (2 November 
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Moreover when applicants did name bars they had attended, some tribunal members took extraordinary steps 
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Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FMCA 1707 (7 December 2006) at para 13; N97/16114 [1998] 
RRTA 4882 (2 November 1998) at 6 and 7. 
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There is also an expectation that because someone is lesbian or gay they will be well informed 
about the legal and political issues faced by people of minority sexualities in their country of 
origin. Thus in the 2004 case of Laszlo the applicant was disbelieved because he did not know the 
name of a particular gay organisation,106  a finding upheld by the Federal Court of Canada as ‘a 
logical plausibility finding that a person belonging to a persecuted minority would be interested in 
how members of that persecuted minority is [sic] treated in his country of refuge and/or show an 
interest in their community’.107 Tribunals have also held that applicants could not be gay because 
they did not know whether or not gay sex was legal in their country of origin,108 could not give 
detail  as  to  the  exact  terminology  used  in  the  criminal  legislation109   (despite  the  fact  that 
differently constituted tribunals themselves evinced considerable confusion over the same 





The Federal Court of Canada has repeatedly castigated the Canadian tribunal for drawing 
conclusions about plausibility based upon stereotype or inference that is not founded on 
evidence.112 For example, the court overturned as patently unreasonable the finding that a woman 
who had her first lesbian relationship in her 50s was not credible because most people discover 
their sexuality at a much younger age and she claimed that she was happy to be a lesbian.113 The 
court also overturned the finding that a man who was ‘truly’ gay would not describe himself as 
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assessment at the tribunal level was no more than a process of projection or inference, including 
inference about applicants’ motivations or state of mind, which extended far beyond what was 
knowable. A stunning example of this occurred in a 2006 Canadian case concerning a lesbian 
from the Ukraine.115 The applicant claimed that as a young woman in 1979 she had expressed her 
feelings to a female friend while at a graduation dance together. When questioned by the tribunal 
about why she chose a ‘public event’ (on which no aspect of the narrative of later persecution 
turned) to reveal her feelings, the claimant responded that this occasion was the last that she 
would see the woman in question and added that: 
 
she did not shout her secret out loud, but merely whispered it to [the woman] and further 
that she treated [her] with gentleness, such as a touch on the shoulder or a move towards 
her during watching movies, and was not turned down. She also stated that she was young 
and would not take the same risk again.116 
 
 
Despite this explanation the decision-maker held that the applicant would never have done this 
given the ‘intense homophobic society of Ukraine at the time’.117 On such reasoning the claim of 
virtually every asylum seeker who has had, or attempted, a same-sex relationship in their country 
of origin is implausible because of the inherent risk it entailed. In fact it was a common refrain in 
the cases that it was not ‘plausible’ that applicants would take risks involved in expressing their 
sexuality, such as making sex tapes,118 picking up men in a sauna,119 or even entering into a second 
lesbian relationship having been persecuted for the first.120  There was a raft of other cases in 
which plausibility assessment about responses to violence or the threat of violence featured in an 
incoherent manner. For instance there were cases in which decision-makers held that it was 
implausible for an applicant not to have sought police assistance after experiencing homophobic 
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Audrey Macklin has suggested the possibility that decision-makers’ frustration at the paucity of 
evidence may lead them to ‘compensate by purporting to draw firm inferences from flimsy 




The applicant in the Ukrainian case above went on to detail her marriage and relationship with 
two other women over a period of several years. The second woman ‘got frightened with the 
thought of a lesbian relationship, wanted to preserve her marriage and turned her down’ while 
her relationship with a third woman ended when that woman left for England with a man.124 The 
tribunal’s finding on this sequence of events — which occurred in the ‘intense homophobia’ of 
Ukrainian society in the 1980s — was that, ‘[w]hile it is not impossible for someone to be bi- 
sexual it is, on the balance of probabilities, not plausible for the claimant to make three 
unsuccessful relationships’.125 Again the implicit frame of reference for the plausibility assessment 
here is one of speculation: only a certain number of girlfriends – fewer than three – could be 




Earl Russell in English parliamentary debates has opined that, ‘Credibility is a way by which the 
interviewer is able to express his ignorance of the world. What he finds incredible is what 
surprises him’.127 This criticism is well illustrated by a 2006 Canadian case in which the decision- 
maker held that the applicant’s claim of exploring his sexuality by watching ‘gay movies’ at an 
internet café with ‘wooden booths’ in Lahore was ‘implausible’ in an Islamic state – but notably 
did not refer to any source of country evidence to test this assumption.128 Some finding of 
implausibility clearly reflected decision-makers’ own ignorance of how gay men experience their 
sexuality, such as when rejecting the idea that non-verbal cues could be the basis upon which 
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men might identify each other as gay,129  or that men may meet other men for sex in ostensibly 




Guy Coffey has suggested that many plausibility determinations are based on factors that are 
 
‘inherently difficult to corroborate or rebut’ and that in such circumstances, a negative finding on 
credibility does not meet the UNHCR ‘benefit of the doubt standard’.131 At the most basic level, 
commentators have urged that any determination of plausibility be based upon objective facts 
and clearly state the basis against which the applicant’s claim is being assessed as unlikely, so that 
it can be reviewed if it is factually incorrect or based upon an improper premise.132 The examples 








Numerous suggestions have been made in recent years to improve the quality and consistency of 
credibility assessment in  refugee  determinations. These  coalesce  around  two  main  themes: 
stricter  control  of  discretion  and  improving  the  calibre  of  decision-makers.  Controlling 
discretion may be pursued proactively through legislative avenues, or more commonly through 
administrative guidelines, that set out standards for credibility assessment and delineate improper 
evidentiary practice.133    It may also occur reactively through the enunciation of standards of 
lawfulness by courts undertaking judicial review of credibility decisions. Improving the quality of 
lower level decision-makers may  occur through enhanced requirements for professional or 
 
 
129  ‘[H]e said that he could see from the appearance of a person and that he would approach them. The panel 
does not find this plausible’: Hussain v Canada [2004] RPDD No 732 (17 September 2004) at para 40. ‘It is not 
credible that such a man would publicly display body language and facial expressions which would cause him 
public notice and trouble in a homophobic society’: Kravchenko v Canada [2004] RPDD No 384 (9 February 
2004) at para 16; overturned on judicial review as based on stereotype: Kravchenko v Canada [2005] FCJ No 




See eg first instance decision quoted on review in SZIXG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
[2007] FMCA 1331 (30 July 2007). In one extraordinary case, the Canadian tribunal actually viewed a sex tape 
of the applicant and held that it did not involve his claimed partner because the perfunctory nature of the sex, 
lack of smiling and conversation led them to conclude that ‘The sex acts appear so mechanical it looks more like 
an encounter between a “John” and a male prostitute, rather than two men very much in love with each other’: 
Re HSO [2001] CRDD No 19 (21 February 2001) at para 8. 
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See  eg:  Anker  above  note  2;  Brian  Gorlick,  ‘Improving Decision-Making in  Asylum Determination’, 
UNHCR Working Paper No 119 (2005). 
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educational qualifications prior to appointment, more transparent or merit-based appointment 
processes, greater independence of decision-making bodies from government, and the provision 
of initial and on-going training.134 
 
 
Each of these avenues offers the potential for positive developments. However, as I explain 
below, their effectiveness may also be impaired by what has been described by Robert Thomas 
as the most intractable problem of credibility assessment: ‘the decision-makers’ own presence of 
self’.135  For this reason, any attempt at formal or structural change must be accompanied by 
simultaneous recognition of the need for the creation of a ‘critical space’. As articulated by 
Crépeau  and  Nakache,  ‘critical  space’  encapsulates  both  individual  and  institutional  self- 







Judicial review constitutes an invaluable check on the discretion of administrative decision- 
makers in refugee adjudication. Although judicial review is limited in reach because it is reactive, 
it has the benefit that it is specific in identifying actual errors and so may have a more acute 
impact on lower level decision-makers than proactive but general guidelines. To be effective, 
review mechanisms must provide sufficiently broad grounds upon which to appeal credibility 
findings (such as lack of evidence to support findings of implausibility, failure to state reasons, or 
conclusions that are ‘patently unreasonable’). Judicial review must also be practically accessible to 
claimants, which is strongly determined by factors such as cost, complexity of process and 
eligibility for publicly funded legal representation. These factors are interlinked in practice: as 
grounds of review have been stringently narrowed in countries such as Australia, the judicial 
review process and the need for legal representation becomes more acute, since the complexity 
of proceedings is heightened. This is well illustrated in Australian judicial review cases from 2001 
onwards, during which time the grounds of review were strictly narrowed.  Of 149 court cases 
there  was  an  almost  even  split  between  represented  and  unrepresented  litigants,137   with 
dramatically different outcomes: unrepresented litigants had a positive decision rate of 2.3 per 
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See eg François Crépeau and Delphine Nakache, ‘Critical Spaces in the Canadian Refugee Determination 
System: 1989-2002’ (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 50. 
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cent, while for those with legal representation at the hearing their success rate was more than ten 
times higher, at 29 per cent. Yet it is clear that recommending expanded availability of judicial 
review and legal aid funding of refugee appeals is mere wishful thinking in the current climate, as 
most receiving nations continue to reform their systems in the opposite direction.138 In this 
context, guidelines and training aimed at lower level decision-makers appear far more viable 
avenues of potential reform. 
 
 
It is notable that most recent legislative attempts to guide credibility assessment have been 
directed towards the negative assessment of credibility based on certain factors, such as delay or 
undocumented identity.139 Such reforms reflect current political imperatives that favour limiting 
acceptance rates and ‘fast-tracking’ adjudication processes.140 To the contrary, a commitment to 
high quality decision-making would entail measures that also include factors relevant to positive 
credibility assessment or a neutral approach in the absence of contrary evidence. This could be 
achieved, for example, through the incorporation into legislation of both the UNHCR ‘benefit 
of the doubt’ standard141 and the ‘presumption of truthfulness’ approach to sworn testimony.142 
Requirements that credibility findings be clearly stated and supported by reasons143  and that 
adverse findings must be based on relevant or non-peripheral matters could also be encapsulated 
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Current administrative guidelines on the assessment of credibility vary widely in terms of the 
comprehensiveness of their content, scope of applicability and legal weight. The Canadian 
guidelines are regarded as a model of their kind, with thorough coverage of a wide range of 
issues, detailed use of case law examples and incorporation of both the benefit of the doubt and 
presumption of truthfulness standards.145 By contrast, the UK and Australian guidelines are 
comparatively brief. Yet even the most exemplary guidelines only provide a broad framework for 
decision-making. For example a list of factors to consider in credibility assessment does not 
resolve the tension involved in balancing such factors or weighing contrary evidence.146  While 
the Canadian guidelines apply to their tribunal, the UK guidelines apply only to the bureaucratic 
level officers at first instance and not to de novo hearings before the tribunal, while in Australia 
the situation is reversed with the guidelines applying to the tribunal but not to the first instance 
bureaucratic level. Importantly, such administrative guidelines do not bind the relevant decision- 
maker in any of the countries under discussion, such that failure to consider credibility guidelines 




A number of commentators have suggested that formal rules may be of less significance in the 
refugee  determination  process  than  other  aspects  such  as  decision-making  culture.148    In 
interviews with former tribunal members in Canada,  Crépeau and Nakache found that decision- 
makers viewed credibility assessment as ultimately relying less upon rules than upon ‘a constant 
effort to keep an open mind, to listen, to remain focused on the core elements of the claim, to 
guard against judging plausibility based on one’s own cultural norms’.149 It is therefore important 
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were held by the Federal Magistrates Court to be non-binding: M100 of 2004 v Minister for Immigration & Anor 
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Specific sexual orientation guidelines could be useful to structure questioning appropriately, 
avoid intrusive questioning and alert decision-makers to stereotyped assumptions about the 
‘plausible’ expression of gay sexuality. The closest equivalent at present is the availability of 
gender guidelines in a number of countries.150 None of these guidelines addresses sexual 
orientation in any detailed or substantive way.151  Given that UNHCR has now acknowledged 
that sexual orientation and gender claims are related in the sense that both arise from non- 
conformity to traditional gender roles,152 one possibility is to refashion existing gender guidelines, 
devised to respond to the experiences of women, in order to include gender and sexual 
orientation  issues  that  concern  both  women  and  men.153    Alternately,  sexual  orientation 
guidelines could be developed154 for use alongside gender guidelines. 
 
However such guidelines are only helpful if they are actually used. Taking gender guidelines as a 
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a decade155 and in the UK for several years156 they appear to have been honoured far more in the 
breach  than  the  observance  at  all  levels  of  the  refugee  determination  process  in  those 
countries.157  Failure to adhere to administrative guidelines is generally not grounds for judicial 
review, which may also render ineffectual the use of guidelines as a tool to structure discretion at 
lower levels.158 In addition a proliferation of guidelines may add to rather than resolve confusion; 
for example, in the UK, guidelines on credibility assessment and on gender are among a group of 
over 40 ‘Asylum Policy Instructions’ that are intended to guide first instance decision-makers.159 
Guidelines must be both understood and genuinely integrated into the decision-making process 
in order to be meaningful. It is particularly notable that, despite excellent on-going judicial 
guidance on credibility and detailed credibility guidelines, many of the examples of poor 
credibility determinations given earlier are drawn from recent Canadian tribunal decisions.  This 
suggests that formal guidance, however detailed and thoughtful, has not permeated the lower 








Of the countries under discussion, it is notable that three of them – the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand –  use relatively low-level government employees as the first instance decision-maker, 
and a specialist administrative tribunal is only called upon to make a decision if an applicant has 







The Australian guidelines were originally directed to the bureaucratic level but omitting to consider the 
guidelines at tribunal level was held to constitute legal error in Applicants M16 of 2004 v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1641 (24 November 2005) and MZXFJ v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FMCA 1465 (10 October 2006), the latter being the 
only Australian case at any level in our pool to refer to the guidelines. 
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— The Australian Experience’ (2005) 17 International Journal  of Refugee  Law 7; Ceneda and Palmer above 
note 24; Asylum Aid (2007) above note 24 at paras 11-13. Moreover since being reconstituted in 2005 the new 
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errors of law only,160 in Australia and New Zealand the tribunal exercises full merits review and 
re-makes the decision. Canada, by contrast, utilises its specialist refugee board as the actual first 
decision-maker, rather than as a body that ‘stands in the shoes’ of the first decision-maker or 
reviews its errors. This has two important implications. First, commentators have noted that a 
specialist tribunal which begins with the file comprising a negative determination from 
government is more likely to undertake its determination in a sceptical frame of mind; in practice 
if not in law this places a burden on the applicant to ‘reverse’ the negative decision.161 Secondly, 
and relatedly, the original refugee determination in such systems has been made by a person who 
is likely to have a much lower level of education and specialist training than that required of 
decision-makers at tribunal level, as well as significantly less independence. 
 
 
Thus any effort to improve the quality of decision-makers at tribunal level may be hampered if 
not accompanied by corresponding efforts to improve the quality of decision-makers at the 
bureaucratic  level.  In  the  UK,  UNHCR  has  focused  considerable  attention  on  improving 
training and standards for bureaucratic level decision-makers in recent years.162    Prior to these 
efforts, first instance UK decision-makers were drawn from the general pool of public servants 
with a requirement only of high school level education.163 
 
 
While a tribunal structure enables more independent decision-making compared to that 
undertaken by bureaucrats within a government department, the largely non-transparent and 
political  nature  of  administrative  appointments to  refugee  tribunals  has  also  given  rise  to 
concerns about both quality and independence. For example in Canada there is a perception of 
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The level of education required for an external appointment is now university degree standard, while internal 
applicants must undergo internal assessment to meet the same level: Fourth Report, id at paras 2.3.7 - 2.3.15. 
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is the perceived independence of tribunal decision-makers who have worked previously within 
the same government department responsible for the decisions under review by them.165 
 
 
In  addition  to  ‘gatekeeper’  measures  such  as  improving  general  educational  standards, 
introducing a transparent merits-based process and ensuring a mix of professional expertise and 
experience in decision-makers,166 the skills and expertise of decision-makers can also be improved 
through on-going training. The framework of appropriate factors to structure decision-making on 
credibility should be augmented with specific information in areas that have been previously 
identified as problematic. Thus general training on credibility assessment must be accompanied 
by specific training on gender and sexual orientation issues. Given the findings of our study, such 
training may be better provided through the use of external experts rather than in-house training. 
While  the  Canadian  tribunal  has  utilized  external  experts  to  conduct  training  on  sexual 
orientation issues since its earliest days,167 the Australian tribunal represents the opposite extreme 
in that it had no form of training regarding sexual orientation for the first 15 years of its 
operation (in which it determined thousands of claims on this issue). In March 2008, after 
significant public pressure arising from a particular case, the Australian tribunal finally conducted 
a two hour external training session on sexual orientation issues.168 
 
 
Greater awareness of issues such as sexual orientation and gender may also require a rethinking 
of traditional categories of expertise when undertaking training. It is common for tribunals to 
categorise or develop member expertise relating to a country, or region, such that specialisation is 
directed to country of origin rather than ground of claim. Yet general knowledge of country 
conditions frequently does not translate into knowledge of the experience of, or documentation 
of the human rights abuses of, sexual minorities in those countries. Lack of specific knowledge of 
country conditions affecting lesbians and gay men is a major and on-going problem in refugee 
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adjudication.169 Overly general or erroneous country information also contributes to poor quality 
credibility assessment on the basis of external inconsistency or implausibility as outlined in this 
article. It is worth considering whether tribunals should develop specialist in-house expertise on 
topic areas, such as gender and sexuality, through dedicated legal or policy staff in order to 
inform decision-making that is usually organised around country specialisation. 
 
 




Granhag and his colleagues make the vital point that those who are meant to be expert in lie 
detection seldom if ever receive any independent verification as to whether their assessment was 
ultimately correct. In the refugee context, ‘feedback is rarely available on whether a person 
granted asylum actually told the truth about his or her reasons, or whether a person refused 
asylum on the basis of a lack of credibility actually did lie’.170    Thus it is at least equally possible 
that, rather than improving in credibility assessment over time, refugee decision-makers actually 
entrench stereotypical ideas or erroneous beliefs about deception throughout their tenure. 
Interestingly, in their interviews with former Canadian tribunal members, Rousseau and Foxen 
found that members felt that their own expertise increased over time.171   Yet these authors 
divided members into those who saw their role as being ‘lie detectors’ and those who saw their 
role as one of dealing with complexity,172 meaning that there was a major divergence in what this 
claimed ‘expertise’ entailed. 
For members who are certain about what they are doing, this impression seems to be tied 
in part to the fact that their certainties become stronger over time. For members who 
grappled with the complexity, the experience seems to be associated with a greater capacity 







See Dauvergne and Millbank above note 18; LaViolette above note 18. On the issue of country information 
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‘appropriate’ and his claim found to be ‘generally consistent’ with ‘a “ring of truth” to it’: NZ Refugee Appeal 
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Refugee adjudication involves the interpretation of a story, but this interpretation takes place 
within a legal framework founded on the idea that truth and falsehood can be objectively 
verified.174  What if, quite simply, they cannot? Audrey Macklin argues that the embrace of such 
uncertainty is a fundamentally important part of the adjudication process. Macklin contends that, 
credibility determination is not about ‘discovering’ truth. It is, rather, about making choices 
– what to accept, what to reject, how much to believe, where to draw the line – in the face 
of empirical uncertainty. Acknowledging that judging is about choosing, and not about 
discovering, shifts the focus of credibility determination in significant ways.175 
 
Once the ‘subjective nature of drawing inferences’ is accepted, Macklin says, ‘The next step is to 
take responsibility for this fact by bringing whatever critical self-awareness one can to  the 
exercise of choosing what and whom to believe’.176 
 
 
This idea of critical self-awareness is central to the recent work of Crépeau and Nakache, 
encompassing both individual and institutional dimensions. At an individual level this involves 
the skills associated with having an ‘open mind’: empathy,177 remaining sensitive despite the heavy 
and at times repetitive case load, being aware of the limitations of one’s own knowledge of the 
country of origin and the applicant’s experiences178  and having the emotional capacity to deal 
with vicarious exposure to trauma.179  At an institutional level this requires maintaining an 
environment that supports and enhances such capacities in its personnel, through training and 
development, independence, a feasible workload, support systems such as peer review and the 
availability of counselling and other forms of emotional support.180 
 
A key aspect of the original Canadian system was that decisions were made by a two member 
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Showler identifies this as a key attribute for decision-makers: above note 25 at xvii. In earlier work I have 
also argued that this includes imaginative capacity: above note 19 
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34  
within the Canadian system.181  The presence of two decision-makers also provided a ‘richer 
critical  space’  than  a  single  member  panel  because  of  the  opportunity  for  reflection  and 
discussion. In the absence of agreement between members, the decision rendered was always 
positive. Thus, Crépeau and Nakache argue, the structure was also a practical manifestation of 
the UNHCR ‘benefit of the doubt’ principle at its broadest.182 
 
 
In Canada, case load pressure led to more and more single member panels sitting through the late 
 
1990s and the early 2000s, and legislative reform formally abolished the two member panel from 
 
2002.183 An additional tribunal review level, comprising a three member appeal panel to act as a 
 
‘check’ upon sole member decisions, was included in the legislation but has not been 
implemented.184  These structural changes have drastically reduced the critical space available in 
the Canadian system. It is difficult to draw any firm statistical conclusions from the Canadian 
case set because the writing and release policies governing decisions varied considerably over the 
span of the study.185     However, when available cases and Board statistics on outcomes are 
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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, ch 27. 
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See Andrew Kitching, ‘Past Statements and Committee Recommendations Regarding Implementation of the 
RAD’, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Canada (2007), 
http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/391/cimm/reports/rp2969755/cimmrp15/10-appe-e.htm (accessed 
12 November 2008). 
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Until 2002 there was no obligation for the Canadian tribunal to write up reasons in positive decisions but 
there were internal guidelines recommending that for ‘novel’ claims reasons should be written; therefore, many 
sexual orientation claims were in fact written up in the early years. Of written decisions, only a small proportion 
is publically released, see above note 13. In later years the use of expedited processes and use of oral reasons in 
positive determinations has meant that written reasons reflect a small proportion of overall decisions and may 
over-represent negative determinations. In response to an Access to Information Request (A-2008-00036, 2 July 
2008) the Immigration and Refugee Board indicated that 77 claims on sexual orientation from Iranian applicants 
were determined from 2002-2006, a further request for access to those decisions (A-2008-00037, 7 July 2008) 
revealed that only two had been released; with a further five comprising written reasons that were not released. 
 
186 
Of available Canadian tribunal cases there was a positive rate of 13 per cent in the second phase of the study 
(2001-2007) compared with 58 per cent in the first phase (1994-2000). In response to an Access to Information 
Request  (A-2008-00035, 2  July  2008)  the  Immigration and  Refugee Board  provided statistics relating to 
finalised claims on the basis of sexual orientation from 2002-2006 (records were not kept by ground of claim in 
20007) which showed that the overall positive rate for all determinations made by the board during that period 
(including expedited decisions, those for which reasons were delivered orally, and those that were written up but 
not released) was 45 per cent. 
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The introduction of multiple member panels was a key recommendation of a review of the 
Australian system in 2000 in order to improve the quality of questioning, enhance consistency of 
decision-making, provide a deliberative process for members, increase collective wisdom and 
decrease the possibility of actual or perceived bias.187  However this recommendation was not 
implemented. In the UK two and three member panels are used at tribunal level, but since 2005 
the tribunal only provides narrow legal review of the earlier decision, rather than merits based re- 
determination of the claim. Thus, the ability to disturb findings of credibility is limited as is any 
real opportunity for critical reflection on the applicant’s claim. New Zealand is therefore alone in 








The wider the gulf between the experiences of the applicant on the one hand and the knowledge 
base and cultural frame of the decision-maker on the other, the greater the likelihood that 
credibility assessment may be problematic. Sexual orientation claims represent aspects of both 
cultural and sexual ‘otherness’ and bring this gulf of understanding into high relief. Yet these 
examples also reveal endemic problems in credibility assessment, and such insights are of broader 
application to refugee decision-making practices worldwide. The cases explored here highlight 
significant problems in credibility assessment in tribunals across four common law jurisdictions, 
the  UK,  Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  In  assessing  demeanour,  consistency  and 
plausibility, decision-makers overestimated their own ability to discern truthfulness, relied upon 
assumptions and failed to fully articulate reasons for disbelief. 
 
 
The distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ elements of demeanour drawn by the 
Canadian guidelines is neither clear cut nor defensible in practice; inferences drawn from an 
applicant’s appearance and their manner in giving evidence may also be subjective and there is 
little to suggest that such inferences are less prone to error. Moreover, in the cases examined, 
reliance placed upon the so-called ‘objective’ element of demeanour was misplaced, leading to 
undue emphasis on free-flowing responses to indicate truthfulness and hesitation or vagueness as 
evidence of deception. This evaluative framework persisted despite the fact that the sensitive (and 





See ‘A Sanctuary under Review’ above note 62 at para 5.88, 5.109-5.111, Recommendation 5.4. 
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contraindicate ease of communication. In a similar vein, well known research on inconsistencies 
in narrative due to trauma and the passage of time did not appear to mitigate almost universal 
reliance in practice upon consistency as a key measure of credibility. In keeping with other 
commentators this study found a strong focus on comity between an applicant’s written and oral 
accounts, including concern with matching comparatively minor details. Perhaps most 
disturbingly, this study discovered that many findings on the basis of ‘plausibility’ rested upon 
speculation or assumptions about human behaviour which were unfounded on the evidence. 
 
 
Despite legislative efforts to curb judicial review of asylum determinations, refugee appeals in 
courts continue to proliferate, markedly increasing both in absolute numbers and as a proportion 
of available cases in our study in later years.188 The proportion of refugee decisions overturned on 
judicial review is — and even after the severe truncation of review grounds in many jurisdictions, 
remains — comparatively high.189 The significant number of decisions set aside on judicial review 
is even more notable when placed in the context of strict statutory thresholds for legal error and 
the long established deference of appellate courts to findings of fact at first instance. This article 
suggests that a fair proportion of applications for review may well be the product of poor quality 
decision-making on credibility at tribunal level. 
 
 
A plausible solution for governments concerned about refugee matters generating case-load 
pressure on courts is to invest resources in improving the quality of earlier level decision-making. 
This could be pursued through many of the suggestions outlined above to more closely structure 
decision-maker discretion, such as the creation and use of guidelines on credibility assessment, 
including  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  and  fact  sharing  burden  in  such  guidelines,  generating 
guidelines on the specific issues raised by sexual orientation claims,. consideration of the force 
given  to  administrative  guidelines  and  expanding  the  scope  of  appeal  mechanisms.  Other 
measures to improve the quality of decision-making include enhanced selection and training 
 
188 
In Australia there were 149 judicial review decisions in phase 2 of the study from 2001-2007 (comprising 52 
per cent of available decisions) compared to only 10 judicial review cases (4 per cent of available decisions) in 
the first phase, 1994-2000. In Canada the number of judicial review cases rose to 109 (40 per cent of decisions) 
in the second phase of the study from 13 cases (10 per cent) in the first phase. In the UK judicial review cases 
rose from 12 in the first phase to 34 (although this actually representing a decline in proportion of judicial review 
cases because so few tribunal cases were released in the earlier period). See notes 7, 8, and 9 above. 
 
189 
In a 2002 submission concerning legislation designed to limit judicial review, the Refugee Council of Australia 
noted that 30 per cent of 1997-1998 Australian tribunal decisions that went to the Federal Court were overturned or 
remitted by consent:   ‘Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee on Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Bill 2002’ April 2002. After many reductions in judicial review, this 
figure was 11 per cent a decade later: Australian Government, MRT and RRT Annual Report 2006-2007 (2007) Table 
4.11. 
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measures for both tribunal and lower level decision-makers. While less likely in the short-term, it 
is also worth considering the pursuit of more profound institutional and structural change, such 
as placing the responsibility for original refugee status determinations within a specialist tribunal 
rather than a government immigration department, and introducing (or in the case of Canada, 
reinstating) dual member tribunals. Such reforms would help to develop a framework for higher 
quality, more critical, refugee decision-making. 
